To what extent do migrants carry their culture with them, and to what extent do they acquire the culture of their new home? The answer not only has important political implications; it also helps us understand the extent to which basic cultural values are enduring or malleable; and whether cultural values are traits of individuals or are attributes of a given society. Part I considers theories about the impact of growing social diversity in Western nations. We classify two categories of society: ORIGINS (defined as Islamic Countries of Origin for Muslim migrants, including twenty nations with plurality Muslim populations) and DESTINATIONS (defined as Western Countries of Destination for Muslim migrants, including twenty-two OECD member states with Protestant or Roman Catholic majority populations).
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To explore these issues, Part I considers alternative arguments about the potential consequences of the experience of migration for cultural change. Theories of cultural integration suggest that immigrants gradually absorb the values and norms which predominate in their host society, especially on an inter-generational basis. By contrast, theories of divergence suggest that distinctive social values and norms are enduring and deep-rooted within each nation, shaped by collective histories, common languages, and religious traditions, so that migrant populations are unlikely to abandon their cultural roots when they settle in another country. We propose to test these claims by examining whether the basic values of Muslim migrants are closer to those prevailing in their societies of origin or destination. Part II describes the research design and the empirical evidence used in this study, drawing Cultures have multiple dimensions and this study focuses on four important indicators. We analyze attitudes towards gender equality and sexual liberalization, areas where previous research has demonstrated that a cultural cleavage divides Islamic and Western societies. 9 Muslim practices of forced marriages, polygamy, domestic violence, and honor killings, as well as patriarchal beliefs about the traditional roles of women in the family, and the symbolic wearing of the hijab, niqab and burqa, have proved controversial by conflicting with the more egalitarian gender roles, the liberal social values, and the secular legal frameworks prevailing in Western countries. 10 We also compare religious values, where we expect to find strong contrasts between Muslim migrants and the increasingly secular Western publics. 11 Lastly, the study compares democratic attitudes, representing important components of civic integration for new citizens in Western countries. Multicultural theories argue that migrants should be engaged in the rights and responsibilities of democratic citizenship in their host societies, even though they should be free to maintain distinct cultural identities, practices and beliefs. 12 To analyze the underlying drivers of cultural integration, we examine whether the values under comparison can be explained by: (1) individual-level Muslim religious identities, controlling for many factors which may shape both social values and transnational mobility, including levels of education and socio-economic status, marital status, labor force participation, religiosity, age, and gender; or (2) living within Islamic or Western societies, at macro-level, controlling for world region. Hierarchical linear models (HLM) are employed, specifically multilevel regression analysis, as the most appropriate technique for examining the strength of both macro-level and individual-level data simultaneously. 13 Updating and extending previous research, the results presented in Part III highlight two major findings.
First, as expected, compared with Western nations, Islamic societies prove highly conservative on issues of sexuality and gender equality, including support for egalitarian roles for women in the home, workforce, and public sphere. Islamic societies are also far less tolerant towards issues of sexual liberalization, as manifested in their attitudes towards abortion, divorce and homosexuality. Not imprint on values than individual-level religious identities, or indeed the effects of an individual's education, age, gender, and income. Some previous studies argue that Muslim migrants encounter particular difficulties with cultural integration into European societies. 15 By contrast, the results of the analysis is largely consistent with previous studies based on other populations, such as the integration of Mexican migrants into the U.S., suggesting common underlying processes are at work. 16 In interpreting these results, we suspect that in the short-term, one reason why Muslim migrants express values located between their countries of origin and destination may be self-selection:
people already sympathetic towards Western cultures, as well as those with the higher skills and status which facilitate mobility, are more likely to relocate to live in affluent post-industrial societies.
Nevertheless in the long-term, there is probably a reciprocal process at work, especially for the second and third generations of migrant families. Our overall view of these findings is that Muslim migrants do not come to Western countries with rigidly fixed attitudes; instead, they gradually absorb the values As a normative ideal, the concept fell out of favor in America during the 1960s, driven in large part by the civil rights and black power movement, and by the growing diversity of new waves of migrants from around the world, as well as by a reaction discrediting ethnocentric assumptions about the superiority of Anglo-American culture in the United States. 29 In recent years, however, several social scientists have produced revised and updated versions of the assimilation thesis, stripped of its normative connotations. The most comprehensive and analytically-rigorous theory, developed by Alba and Lee, identifies a variety of mechanisms that facilitate the integration of minorities into American society, emphasizing the role of human capital, social networks, and the institutional arrangements of the state and labor market. 30 Portes and Zhou suggest that segmented assimilation typically occurs for second generation immigrants in the United States, emphasizing that integration into the workforce or community is far from automatic, and it occurs at varying rates for different types of ethnic groups. 31 European scholars have been drawing upon these ideas to understand integration occurring among second generation groups in the EU. 32 Compared with Europe, however, the United States may prove to be distinctive in its more tolerant cultural attitudes towards migrants, as a society founded historically 
Or to what extent do migrants carry their original culture with them?
Yet alternative theories of multiculturalism suggest that Muslim migrants, who have acquired deep-rooted and enduring social norms and cultural values through processes of childhood socialization within the family, local community, and country, will carry their culture with them when they travel. In this view, persisting ethnic sub-cultures in multicultural societies, or even deepening divergence between minority and majority communities, seems the most likely scenario. Benedict Anderson argues that national cultures and collective identities are shaped by common histories, shared languages, and deep-rooted religious traditions that persist for centuries. 37 Supporting this claim, empirical analyses by Acemoglu et al. trace contemporary cross-national differences in economic development and levels of democracy to cultural and institutional differences (or "nation-specific factors") established as much as five hundred years ago. 38 The experience of migration to another country may strengthen the awareness and importance of regional, national, or religious identities, rather than weakening them. 39 Historically, traditional ideas of assimilation within American society came under challenge during the 1960s, and the core idea was politically discredited, not least by the persistent structural inequalities that continued to be experienced by African-Americans. 40 Some empirical evidence also supports observations about enduring cultural differences; Rice and Feldman analyzing cumulated data from the General Social Survey, find strong correlations between the values of various ethnic groups in the U.S., and the values prevailing in their countries of origin-two or three generations after their families migrated to the U.S. 41 . Ethnographic studies of disaffected
Muslim youth, such as Bangladeshis in the UK, report that these groups are turning to revivalist Islam in reaction to political and cultural alienation from the West. 42 Analysis of the UK Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities found that Muslims integrate less fully, and more slowly, than other non-Muslim migrants (Asians, Hindu and Caribbean). 43 In Spring 2006, Pew surveys compared public opinion in four
European countries (Britain, France, Germany and Spain) alongside Muslim minorities in these countries, reporting that both groups perceived a sense of growing Islamic identity and concern about Islamic extremists. 44 The majority of Europeans expressed doubts that Muslims coming into their countries wanted to adopt their national customs and way of life. A subsequent Pew survey in Fall 2008 reported that many Europeans also viewed Muslims in an increasingly negative light, especially in France, Germany and Spain. 45 As mentioned earlier, the incidence of radical protest involving inter-communal violence, and cases of outright terrorist incidents involving small groups of militant Muslims, lends further plausibility to the divergence argument. Zealand showed relatively similar religious, political, economic, social and sexual norms. Analysis of data from subsequent waves of the Values Surveys confirms that these findings are robust over time. 48 If the multiculturalism thesis is correct, then where substantial cultural differences exist between countries of origin and countries of destination, migrants will express values that are closer to those predominating in their country of origin, rather than to those of their destination. Moreover any significant cultural differences among majority and minority populations are not be expected to diminish among second and third generation migrants; indeed if alienation from the West has occurred, as some observations suggest, then this could even potentially strengthen Muslim identities among younger populations.
II: Comparative framework, evidence and research design
What research design is best suited to analyze the empirical evidence? Much previous survey research seeking to understand these issues has focused on public opinion towards immigration within each host society, for example Strabac and Listhaug used the European Social Survey to examine prejudicial attitudes towards ethnic minority populations, while Panagopoulos examined American attitudes towards Muslims and Arab-Americans in the aftermath of 9/11. 49 Studies have also analyzed public attitudes in Western countries towards the related topics of labor mobility, trade liberalization, and economic protectionism. 50 Lahav examines European preferences for particular types of immigration policy, at mass and elite levels, showing that many Europeans find immigrants to be threatening. 51 It is important to understand public opinion in Western societies, as perceptions of immigration is one of the factors facilitating or restricting processes of integration. But this only reflects one side of the relationship, rather than directly comparing the cultural values of minority and majority populations.
Within-societal comparisons of majority and minority publics have also often been employed.
Given the limited sample size of most standard nation-wide social surveys, analysis is usually based on specially-designed matching surveys that over-sample specific types of minority populations. A series of 13 items were selected to monitor cultural values towards gender and sexuality, religiosity, and democracy, and their dimensions were examined using factor analysis. The results presented in Table 2 show that the items monitoring tolerance of homosexuality, abortion and divorce formed one consistent dimension, representing positive orientations towards issues of sexual liberalization and choice. The items concerning gender equality tapped into approval of traditional or egalitarian roles for men and women in the workforce, elected office and university education, forming a consistent scale that we have used in an earlier detailed study. 65 Support for democratic values and principles was monitored using four items: approval of having a democratic political system, and agreement or disagreement with questions about having a strong leader who does not have to bother with elections, having experts take decisions instead of government, and having military rule. The separate dimensions were summed and standardized into 100-point scales, for ease of comparison, with the full items listed in the Technical Appendix.
[ Table 2 about here]
III: Results and findings
The descriptive mean position of the groups on the four 100-point value scales is shown in Table 3 and So far we have examined the descriptive means at societal levels but of course before we can attribute these to the type of predominant religion in each society, or to individual Muslim religious identities, we need to control for a number of important variables. After all, Muslim migrants may well prove distinctive from their compatriots for many reasons; for example, younger groups, and those with greater educational qualifications or higher socioeconomic resources, may well find it easier to relocate.
The use of Hierarchical Linear Models, in particular multilevel regression analysis, is an appropriate technique for comparing the impact of societal-level and individual-level factors simultaneously. We theorize that Muslim religious identities will have a direct effect on individual values. We also predict that living in Islamic societies will be important for the diffusion of cultural values.
To operationalize these factors, the key models involve measurement at two distinct levels. A representative sample of individual respondents (level 1) is nested within national-level contexts (level 16 2). The WVS/EVS was conducted among a representative random sample of the adult population within each country. Given the use of multilevel data, hierarchical linear models (HLM) are most appropriate for analysis, including multilevel regression analysis. The models in this study use restricted maximum likelihood techniques (REML) to estimate direct and cross-level effects for hierarchical data. Individual respondents are thus grouped into countries. Each country has a different set of parameters for the random factors, allowing intercepts and slopes to vary by nation. 70 In hierarchical linear models, as is customary, all independent variables were centered, by subtracting the grand mean (which becomes zero). The standardized independent variables all have a standard deviation of 1.0. This process also helps to guard against problems of collinearity in the independent variables in the OLS models. The independent variables were treated as fixed components, reflecting the weighted average for the slope across all groups, while nation was treated as a random component, capturing the country variability in the slope. The strength of the beta coefficients (slopes) can be interpreted intuitively as how much change in the dependent variable is generated by a one-percent change in each independent variable.
The multilevel regression models used in this study usually generate small differences in the size of the slope coefficient (b) compared with the results of OLS models, but the average standard errors for level 2 variables tend to be slightly larger. The process is thus more rigorous and conservative, avoiding Type I errors (false positives, concluding that a statistically-significant difference exists when, in truth, there is no statistical difference). In the REML model, by contrast, Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion (BIC) is used, where the model with the lower value is the best fitting.
Level 1 in our core models includes the following individual-level Muslim religious identities, along with several other standard controls, described in the Technical Appendix, including male gender (0/1), household income using a 10-point scale, age (in years), the education scale, marital status, labor force participation, and religiosity (the Importance of God 10-point scale). Level 2 includes nationallevel variables, including the classification of societies into Islamic or Western Christian (see Table 1 ), based on the religious proportion of each country's population. In addition, we also control for the location of Islamic countries (classified as in the Middle East or elsewhere in the world), to test whether these societies differ.
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To see whether generational processes are gradually closing any remaining value gaps, Figure 5 illustrates the attitudes by age category and by type of social group. The graphs show that across each of the value scales, the societal-level gaps largely persist (concerning democracy), or even widen (for sexual liberalization and religiosity), by age group. On religiosity, for example, the younger population in Western societies is increasingly secular compared with older generations. By contrast, Islamic Muslims, and Western Muslims, show a far slower process of age-related change towards religious values. Similar observations can be made concerning attitudes towards sexual liberalization; here younger Western Muslims are indeed becoming more tolerant than middle-aged and older generations, but the change among Western publics is far greater. As a result, although Western Muslims are consistently located between Islamic and Western societies, there is no evidence that generational change, by itself, will transform the situation so that the cultural differences between Muslim migrants and Western publics will disappear: younger Westerners are adopting modern values even more swiftly than their Muslim peers.
IV: Conclusions and Implications
There has been widespread public debate about how far Western societies can manage the growing social diversity produced by the rising influx of migrants flowing across national borders, and, in Nevertheless, substantial national differences are apparent, and the gap between Muslim and Western societies is particularly large. They do not concern fundamental disagreement about whether democracy is a desirable form of government. But they do involve tolerance of sexual liberalization and women's equality-and tolerance is a particularly crucial aspect of a democratic political culture. Do such cultural differences necessarily lead to tensions or even clashes? No. Under high levels of existential insecurity, xenophobia and intolerance are particularly intense and likely to lead to violence.
Conversely, conditions of security are conducive to relative tolerance of diversity; indeed, at high levels of existential security, cultural pluralism is regarded as enriching the diversity of lifestyles, the range of
choices that are open to people. Cultural differences are a potential fault line that demagogues can exploit to inflame hatred between groups. But there is nothing inevitable about cultural conflict.
Depending on conditions, diversity can be seen either as threatening or as a positive contribution Table 2 for the detailed survey items. ANOVA tests for differences in means across groups were performed. The strength of association coefficient was measured by Eta coefficients. The asterisks (***) denote differences in these coefficients that are significant at the 1 percent level. All independent variables were standardized using mean centering (z-scores). Models present the results of the REML multilevel regression models including the beta coefficient, (the standard error below in parenthesis), and the significance. The 100 point scales are constructed from the items listed in Table 2 
Source: Pooled World Values Survey, 1981-2007

Religious values scale
This is a composite 100-point scale constructed by summing the following items: Importance of God, Religious identity, Importance of religion, Frequency of attending religious services, Take moments of prayer or meditation, How often think about meaning of life? 
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